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TO : Assistant Director for Reports and Estimates DATE: 8 December 1949

FROM : Chief, Near East/Africa Division

SUBJECT: Intelligence Production Planning

Reference: (a) Memorandum from AD/ORE to DCI (with attachments), dated 2 December 1949

(b) EPB Notice No. 1-49, dated 7 December 1949

(c) ORE Operating Procedure No. 29, dated 28 February 1949

1. Reference document (b) placed reference document (a) on the agenda of the EPB meeting scheduled for 7 December. The meeting was adjourned, however, before reference document (a) could be discussed, and so the subject of intelligence production planning was tabled until the next regular meeting of the EPB, presumably scheduled for 14 December. D/NE believes that the following queries and comments on production planning and certain related matters should be discussed at this meeting.

2. First of all, what is the role of the Estimates Production Board? According to reference document (c), one of its functions is to "Review and approve the periodic issuance of the CIA Intelligence Production Plan..." * Moreover, its title and its position on the ORE organization chart would certainly suggest that the EPB is designed to advise the AD/ORE on all phases of intelligence production. Such, however, seems not to be the case. Reference document (a) - "Development of an Integrated Intelligence Production Program" - and its attachments clearly fall within the province of the EPB if, as we believe, the EPB should have a place in determining production planning. Nevertheless, reference document (a) was sent forward to the DCI before it was ever presented to the EPB. Under these circumstances, such post facto discussion as might have taken place at the EPB meeting on 7 December could have served no very useful purpose.

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3. In the second place, D/NE is concerned over the fate of the various comments and suggestions solicited from time to time by the Plans and Policy Staff and turned in by the producing components of ORE. So far as we can make out, they are merely put into a hold file. With respect to the Far East draft plan, for instance, a representative from Plans and Policy consulted D/NE in February or March 1949. At that time we raised certain objections and made a number of suggestions, but we heard nothing further of the plan until 24 August, when a draft was circulated and comments were requested. After considerable thought, D/NE submitted two memoranda, dated 14 September 1949, containing comments and outlining a new approach to the

*Reference document (c) is actually concerned with the IPB. It is assumed, however, that the change in nomenclature from IPB to EPB entails no change in the Board's duties.

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task of production planning. Regardless of the merit or lack of merit of these memoranda, we expected them to evoke some response and discussion, possibly even an attempt to reconcile the divergence between the views represented by them and by the Far East plan. To date, nothing has been heard of these memoranda.

4. Further, D/NE is seriously disturbed by the failure to coordinate the various attempts currently or recently under way in ORE to solve the problem of intelligence production and, by extension, to define the mission of ORE. Thus we have attachments A and B of reference document (a); the report of the Ad Hoc Production Review Sub-committee (the Reitzel Committee); and the unannounced discussion of the subject at the EPB meeting on 30 November. These three efforts run in parallel lines which give no indication of converging.

5. Would it not be better to make one concerted effort toward solving this difficult and supremely important problem of production planning? We object to the Far East production plan because, although it does not represent a concerted, all-ORE effort, it is put forward with capital "P's" as if it were a formula applicable to all producing components. Actually it is a specific, detailed plan growing out of the problems of one area. In view of the special nature of these problems, the plan is not applicable to other components and not suitable as an attachment to a staff study which purports to consider overall production planning for ORE. We believe that to obtain a formula generally applicable throughout ORE the whole body of finished intelligence should be examined with the idea of defining, classifying, and assessing the work done thus far. We suggest that the Reitzel report, which represents such an effort, is a step in the right direction. The members of the Reitzel Committee charged with drafting the report found that ORE's whole output fell into several categories or, in other words, represented several types of finished intelligence and also that several production trends were discernible. These findings strike us as a suitable point of departure for full discussion with the EPB with the end of establishing legitimate production categories (as opposed to specific topics) which would be applicable throughout ORE. Whether the categories finally chosen coincided with those in the Reitzel report would be irrelevant. The method is still sound and would -- more than any other, we believe -- facilitate the defining of "national intelligence" and the clarifying of ORE's mission. Finally, the plan resulting from such procedure would represent the best judgment and the free choice of those actually charged with the production of finished intelligence. The producers could therefore be expected to carry it out with confidence and enthusiasm.

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